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Abstract: The legal protection of property rights is increasingly viewed as a crucial,
if not the crucial, condition for economic growth and pro-poor development.
Empirical support is generally based on cross-national correlations between measures
of secure property rights and good development outcomes in the long-run. However,
whether these associations hold in the short- and medium-run has, to our knowledge,
not been studied. In this paper, we evaluate the relationship between the protection of
property rights and growth using three property rights indices from the Heritage
Foundation, Fraser Institute and World Economic Forum covering the experience of
162 countries between 1995 and 2005. While we find a strong correlation between the
level of country property rights protections scores and economic growth, when we
evaluate the change and improvement in country ranking scores of property rights,
this positive association disappears. These findings could be interpreted as indicating
either that there is i) no causal relationship between property rights and growth (at
least in the short-run), or that ii) the property rights indices have poor validity.
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1. Introduction
The overwhelming importance attached to property rights protection as a
condition for growth among new institutional economists is well known (Rodrik et al,
2004). Scholars from the entire political spectrum endorse some version of the view
that a secure property rights regime is a fundamental capitalist institution that
facilitates growth and reduces poverty. There is some disagreement about the
mechanism and conditions under which property rights protection generates growth
and reduces poverty, but, the proposition that secure property rights leads to good
economic outcomes is largely unquestioned 2 .
Recently, the protection of property rights has been increasingly emphasized
in the development literature as well. We refer to this as the property rights
movement, which seeks to grant legal title to the poor for their de facto property as a
developmental program. This consensus is based on the logic that property rights
programs can turn a vast amount of assets held by the poor into legal title. This act
will simultaneously increase incentives to invest as well create a credit-worthy asset
that can be used to raise capital. Although empirical evidence exist for the benefits of
secured property rights, correlation might not show causality, since growth might
have come before property rights, and acted as a spur to their formation.
We address this issue by looking at the change and improvement of ranking
scores in commonly used property rights indicators. After replicating dominant
findings that secure property rights correlate with higher growth and lower poverty
levels as indicated by infant mortality rates, we show that this positive relationship
disappears once we look at the change, as oppose to the level, in property rights
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See for example: Acemoglu et al, 2001; Barro, 1991; Clague et al, 1999; De Long and Shleifer, 1993;
Goldsmith, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999; Hanke and Walters, 1997; Keefer and Knack, 1995; Leblang,
1996; North and Thomas, 1970; Powell, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004; Svensson, 1998; Torstensson, 1994;
Zak, 2002.
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protection. Likewise, in a multivariate regression analysis, the level of property rights
indices is associated with either negative, none, or minimal growth depending on
which indicator is used. These findings however lose significance if we look at
improvements in property rights reforms. In view of these findings, a lack of robust
association between growth and development indicators and changes and
improvements in three major measures of property rights casts critical doubts on their
validity and usefulness. Either there is no clear support for the benefits of increasing
the protection of property rights, at least in the short or medium term, or the indicators
aren’t capturing the actual evolution of property rights.
To further elaborate on these findings, the rest of the paper is as follows.
Section two briefly reviews the theoretical and empirical debate on the protection of
property rights. In the third section, we introduce a critical approach to the analysis
and understanding of the topic of this study. Section four describes our empirical
analysis to test for the alleged positive property rights protection effects. We conclude
with some implications and suggestions to properly evaluate the progress of property
rights in order to better assess their economic and social effects.

2. The Property Rights Movement
The most well known champion of the property rights movement is Hernando
de Soto (2000). De Soto argues that the solution to the problem of underdevelopment
and global poverty is the extension of formal property rights to those that have held
their land in informal and communal systems. Although most of the poor have no
legal title to their assets, de Soto and his team of researchers believe they actually
control vast amounts of resources. For example, de Soto claims that the poor in Egypt
hold $241 billion in real-estate assets, only they do not have legal title over this
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property. If this was legal property, it would be the equivalent of 30 times the value of
the Cairo Stock Exchange (de Soto, 2000). De Soto claims that throughout the world
the poor “own” some 9.3 trillion dollars in informal property. If only the poor had
legal title to this land, it could be used as collateral to obtain credit, which would lead
to development.
Turning customary or de facto tenure into de jure property, de Soto argues,
injects “life” into “dead” capital. It permits for the security of property rights, which is
essential for the creation of incentives that are conducive towards investing capital
and labor in the property in order to generate value. In addition, these newly legal
assets can be used to secure the credit that will provide further investment capital. The
flow of credit will stimulate small scale capitalism and help produce economic growth
in a way that particularly benefits the poor (so called pro-poor growth). Thus, de
Soto’s work adds to the appeal of new institutional economics, which holds that
property rights are highly crucial for a capitalist economy (see the discussion in
Chang, 2007).
Significantly, the United Nations, International Monetary Fund and World
Bank as well as other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have enthusiastically
endorsed property rights reform. The World Bank (2003) noted that formalizing
property rights is “a main vehicle for investing, accumulating wealth, and transferring
it between generations.” This seems to be a promising solution to poverty that, in de
Soto’s metaphor, raises “dead” capital making possible the petty-capitalist path to
development. Given the legal-bootstraps of secure property, the poor can proceed to
use them to pull themselves up from poverty.
To support these pro-property rights arguments, a very large body of macro
and micro level literature has emerged. Cross-country panel data-driven studies have
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made the case for a positive association between property rights levels and higher
incomes per capita (Acemoglu et al, 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Powell,
2002; Zak, 2002;). Bernhard Heitger found using the Fraser Institute’s index that a
doubling of the property rights index more than doubles per capita income (Heitger,
2004). Others have also found a positive association between secured property rights
and lower levels of inequality (Calderón and Chong, 2000; Hanke and Walters, 1997).
Likewise, Paul Zak finds that insecure property rights can cause countries to be
caught in a poverty trap, since these countries lack the institutions that sustain sound
and growing economies (Zak, 2002). Heitger finds that countries that respect the
rights of private property are more likely to raise the accumulation of not only
physical but also human capital (Heitger, 2004). Finally, better respect for private
property rights correlate with longer life expectancies as well as higher marks on the
United Nations Human Development Index (Powell, 2002).
A substantial body of research using household surveys also supports de
Soto’s claims about the usefulness of property rights reform as a developmental
program. In examining a titling program in Peru, Erica Field (2007) exploited a
program evaluation survey dataset and found that individuals with secured land titles
tend to allocate their time more efficiently by spending fewer hours guarding property
and shifting away from work at home to engage in entrepreneurial and formal labor
activity essential for household income. Along the same lines, Thomas Schweigert
(2007) concluded through a household survey that Guatemalan families with formal
farm land titles produce greater output and invested more quality labor towards
generating higher future output.
Although evidence on the effect of property rights and access to credit is
mixed, quantitative studies exploiting household surveys in the Philippines, Ghana,
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Brazil, Nicaragua, and Peru further reveal that families with secured land titles,
independent of having access to credit, increased household and land investments to
improve their dwelling conditions and increase the value of their assets (Alston et al,
1996; Besley, 1995; Field, 2005; Field and Torero, 2006; Laiglesia, 2004; Lynn and
Struyk, 1983). Likewise, other studies suggest that access to land titles allows families
to directly increase their level of human capital. These programs were also found to
lower fertility rates among the young poor and reduce child labor in Peru (Field, 2003,
2007). Galiani and Schargrodsky (2004, 2005) exploited a natural experiment and
found that urban poor families with formal land titles in Argentina were more likely to
improve the health and educational performance of their children.

3. A Critical View to Property Rights Reform
Overall, many have associated property rights reform with favourable socioeconomic outcomes. But what is the causal relationship between property rights
protection and development? Does development cause secure property rights or does
secure property rights cause development? Or is there an inverse U-shaped
relationship between property rights and development – that both very low and very
high levels of property rights protection could be inimical to economic growth (see
Chang, 2007; Kurtz and Schrank, 2007)? Too great a protection of property rights
means that resources will go un-utilized, and less value will be created (e.g. in less
developed countries patents get protected, making the cost of certain inputs too
expensive for local use, or absentee landlords are able to evict productive squatters,
reducing aggregate output and denying people their ability to meet their subsistence
needs).
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Moreover, there seems to be little doubt that capitalist development leads to
more secure property rights over time (Heitger, 2004). The emergence of capitalists
and small property holders generate actors with an interest in creating formal rights to
their property that is backed up by state institutions. In addition, greater wealth allows
for greater education, which combines to create the possibility of a professional
bureaucracy which in turn both upholds, and further extends, the rule of law. The
possibility for reverse causality must be taken seriously given the fact that there are
prominent examples of successful capitalist development in systems with weak
property rights, such as the massive corruption of the Gilded Age in the United States
and the current rapid growth in China –a country with famously mixed and vague
property rights.
Aside from this uncertain causal direction of this relationship, what also
remains almost entirely unexamined is the process of granting legal title and
improving the security of property in the manner proscribed by de Soto and
international institutions. Classical sociology suggests that this process itself might
have enormously disruptive implications for society. Marx (1887) and Weber (1968)
wrote about the separation of workers from the means of subsistence (the “so-called
primitive accumulation”) in the early stages of capitalism, whereby people lost their
access to the land they needed to meet their subsistence needs. Both theorists pointed
out that this process created enormous stress and dislocation for the new working
class. Durkheim (1933) used the language of the “forced division of labor” to capture
this phenomenon, and believed it lead to the surge in anomie that he associated with
suicide and other social problems. Karl Polanyi (1944) theorized this as the fictitious
commodification of land which created markets whose impersonal forces rip the
traditional fabric of society apart. Drawing inspiration from these classical theorists,
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we can suggest the hypothesis that the process of granting formal legal property rights
will generate both winners along with many losers as it destroys the communal basis
of resource allocation.
These classical theories potentially validate a large body of micro-studies that
have surfaced to suggest that the formalization of property rights via the security of
title can increase socio-economic hardship through various mechanisms. For example,
middle and upper classes might manage to usurp the legal title from the poor. The
lack of protective and equal measures in the formalization process can permit those
with power, information and resources to exploit land title programs to amass the
newly titled property (see for example: Platteau, 2000; Mitchell, 2006; Benjaminsen
et al, 2008). Moreover, if the poor do get legal title to their assets, particularly in
poorly functioning markets, this might rapidly produce indebtedness leading to loss of
the property. This is especially true because obtaining and maintaining formal
property means incurring ongoing costs associated with property taxes and fees to
access public services (see for example: Burns, 2006; Cousins et al, 2005; Davis,
2007; Manji, 2007; Mitchell, 2006; Neuwirth, 2006). Thus, the enforcement of
property rights can have the consequence that the poor lose access to their productive
assets. If some of these assets are not utilized by others, this will lead to less
production and thus lower growth.

4. Data, Methods and Results
Beyond considering a critical view to the process of protecting and
formalizing property rights, it is also imperative to re-assess past cross-national
correlations between measures of secure property rights and good development
outcomes. Our methodological strategy to address the issue of causality is straight
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forward. First, we will examine the relationship between property rights protection
and development in static and dynamic models. That is, we will look at the correlation
between the level of property rights protection and development, as well as the
correlation between the change in property rights protection and development. After
addressing causality concerns with this exercise, we carry out a simple multivariate
growth model to test for positive or negative effects of property rights using the level
and improvement of property rights rankings of three of the most commonly used
indices (see Table 1).

Data
These indicators of property rights include: those produced by the US think
tank The Heritage Foundation 3 , the Canadian think tank Fraser Institute 4 , and the
World Economic Forum 5 , the network which most famously sponsors the Davos
meetings, and is a self-consciously global organization that promotes
“entrepreneurship in the global public interest” (World Economic Forum, 2009) (from
website [http:// www. weforum. org/en/about/History%20and% 20 Achievements
/index.htm], accessed May 18, 2009).
At the Heritage Foundation, the property rights ranking scores are arrived at
based on the judgement of Heritage Foundation researchers as well as journalists with
country-level expertise at the Wall Street Journal. The other two think tanks/policy
networks produce their scores with a similar procedure, using academics/experts to
make statistical analysis based on a wide variety of data. It is important to note that
3

Studies which use the Heritage Foundation property rights index include: Acemoglu and Johnson,
2005; Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Goldsmith, 1995; Hanke and Walters, 1997; Johnson et al, 1998;
Norton, 1998; Powell, 2002.
4
Studies with use the Fraser property rights index include: Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2007; Claessens
and Laeven, 2003; Hanke and Walters, 1997; Heitger, 2004; Powell, 2002.
5
Studies which use the World Economic Forum property rights index include: Claessens and Laeven,
2003; Desai et al, 2003; Freeman, 2003; Hanke and Walters, 1997; Hur et al, 2006.
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these property rights scores are sub-indices of the overall indicators that these
organizations formulate on an annual basis. (These include the Heritage’s Index of
Economic Freedom, Fraser’s Economic Freedom World Index and the World
Economic Forum Global Competitive Index).
[Table 1 about here]
As we can see from Table 2 below, these three indicators are highly
correlated. That is as it should be, since they are all supposedly measuring a similar
bundle of factors that guarantee secured “property rights”.
[Table 2 about here]
Aside from employing these indices, we carry out a simple multivariate
growth model to re-examine the relationship between property rights reform and
growth, controlling for initial GDP per capita by using a global panel, comprising 162
countries, with data from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2008
edition.

Methods
Our model specification for GDP per capita growth is based on the augmented
Solow growth model (Solow, 1956). This gives rise to the following two regression
models:
(1)

γi,t = α + β1PRi,t + β2INFLi,t + β3FDIi,t + β4GDSi,t + β5OPENi,t +
β6INITIALGDP + μi + μi * t + εi,t

(2)

γi,t = α + β1IMPit + β2INFLi,t + β3FDIi,t + β4GDSi,t + β5OPENi,t +
β6INITIALGDP + μi + μi * t + εi,t

Here i is country and t is year; γ is the percentage growth in real GDP per capita; PR
is one of the three measures of property rights protections; INFL is log inflation in the
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consumer price index; FDI is foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP; GDS
is gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP; OPEN is trade openness, measured
as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP; INITIAL GDP is the level
of GDP per Capita in 1995; μi is a country-specific fixed effect and μi * t is a set of
country- specific time trends which strengthen the robustness of results. In the second
model, IMP is a dummy variable representing improved property rights scores within
the indices employed in this study. IMP takes on the value of one if the country
improved in protecting property rights in a specific year, and zero otherwise.
Despite our concern regarding the validity of the property rights indices used
in this study, we nevertheless assess which model estimator is the most appropriate
for our analysis by using a set of diagnostic tests proposed by econometric analysis
for cross-sectional time-series data. We first estimate the Breusch and Pagan (1980)
Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for random effects to assess the variance of country
specific effects and see whether we accept the null hypothesis indicating no
unobserved heterogeneity. Running the LM test in our model tells us that we cannot
accept the null hypothesis and therefore cannot ignore the presence of unobserved
heterogeneity.
Thus, the unobserved effect of each panel regression is assessed in fixed and
random effects models where standard errors are clustered by country to reflect nonindependence of sampling and for robustness to serial correlation. A Hausman-like
test of fixed vs. random effects using the stata xtoverid command (Schaffer and
Stillman, 2006) is then conducted to test if the coefficients estimated in both random
and fixed effects models are the same. Following the xtoverid test, we find that fixed
and random effects are different and therefore, fixed effects are more valid to report
as they always give consistent results. But taking into account that fixed effect might
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not however be efficient, we report both random and fixed effects in Tables 5 and 6.

Level versus Change in Property Rights Protection
Although property rights indices highly correlate in full variation, the pattern
reverse or change when we look at the dynamic versions of the variables (see Table
3). Changes in the Heritage Foundation are very mildly correlated with the Fraser
Institute, but have no relationship to changes in the WEF indicator. Changes in the
Fraser Institute indicator are actually negatively correlated with changes in the
World Economic Forum indicator, and although the level is also very low, it is highly
statistically significant. As Table 3 also notes, the correlation of improved ranking
scores between each index is small and insignificant. These observations should throw
up a major caution sign for the validity of these indicators.
[Table 3 about here]
To further elaborate on the level versus change analysis, Table 4 represents the
results of 12 separate correlations. We see that in all three indicators, the level of
property rights has a large negative association with poverty as represented by infant
mortality rates and a large positive association with growth rates per capita. However,
the change in the variables tells a different story. The Heritage Foundation indicator,
used by de Soto himself (2000), has a large negative association with infant mortality
rates. A unit change in property rights is associated with 25% higher infant mortality
rates. The other two indicators had no significant effect on infant mortality.
Change in the Heritage Property Rights Index also shows a strong negative
association with growth. The other two indicators show a much smaller, but still
positive association with growth. These correlations, both in size and level of
significance, are much smaller than the large negative association found with the
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Heritage indicator. If we assess the change as oppose to simply the level of property
rights protection, our analysis suggest a weak causal relationship between property
rights and development. Property rights changes between 1995 and 2005 seem to have
a minimal, if not a negative, impact on economic growth and development. This
empirical finding is further assessed with our regression analysis.
[Table 4 about here]

Regression Results
The coefficients for the regressions of GDP per capita growth on level and
improvement of property rights and several additional explanatory variables are
reported in Table 5 and 6, respectively. When using the Heritage Foundation index,
we find that an increase in the protection of property rights by 1 percent results in
countries experiencing 0.06 percent less growth in GDP per capita during the period
from 1995 to 2005. With the Fraser Index, we find a positive increase of 0.70 percent
of growth during the same time period but it is a less statistically significant finding in
comparison to the Heritage index. The WEF index however, produces a similar
finding as that of the Heritage indicator, estimating 0.70 percent less growth, yet less
statistically significant and found in the random effects model.
[Table 5 about here]
An alternative approach to estimate the effect on growth when the protection
of property rights increases is by creating a dummy variable representing cases where
countries had an actual improvement in their protection of property rights ranking
score. By substituting the property rights index with this dummy variable, we find that
the significance found in the negative or positive associations between property rights
and real GDP per capita growth in Table 5 completely disappear, with the exception
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of the Fraser index as seen in Table 6. With the improved FRASER dummy variable,
we find that improving the protection of property rights increases growth by 0.62
percent, a finding that is statistically significant at an alpha level of 10 percent.
[Table 6 about here]
By and large, the associations found between the protection of property rights
and GDP per capita growth are found to be weak, inconsistent and often
contradictory. If these property rights indices are considered valid measures, there is
at least as much evidence that property rights protection leads to negative, minimal or
no significant growth than the opposite. It all depends on which index one uses.
Considering these indices are allegedly measuring the same metric, this is surprising
and troubling.

5. Conclusion
Our results clearly raise questions about studies showing the beneficial
consequences of strong property rights that use the level of property rights in their
empirical analyses. We show that a dynamic analysis could yield substantially
different results. The change and improvement in property rights, not the overall value
of property rights, must be the object of interest if we are evaluating policy. Indeed,
why bother to construct a yearly data set if not to study the change in the variables?
While we would be surprised if there was nothing to which these codings
correspond, we must keep in mind the lack of correlation, or even the negative
correlation, that we observed in the dynamic versions of these indexes. As a result of
the uncertainty of what policy changes or regulatory changes these scores actually
refer to, we are especially in need of much more specific measures of property rights
which are composed of objective data, as well as much more detailed quantitative
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evaluations of country-level or sub-country level property rights programs to
complement the growing number of qualitative case studies of these phenomena.
These studies should attempt to directly measure the purported mechanisms that we
are assuming are behind the correlations in the cross-national data. Finally, additional
natural experiments should be identified and analyzed.
Overall, these results should be quite troubling for the pro-property rights
advocates that rely on the analyses of these indices to bolster their positions. Either
there is no robust evidence that reforms of property rights has been beneficial, or
these indices don’t really capture the evolution of property rights protection. We
strongly suspect that these indices have unacceptably low validity. Given the lack of
agreement in changes in property rights scores across these indices, it is ambiguous to
use these metrics in policy analysis.
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Table 1
Description of Property Rights Indices.
Source

Index

Description

Heritage
Foundation/Wall
Street Journal
Index of
Economic
Freedom

Property
Rights subindex

Fraser Institute
Economic
Freedom World
Index

Legal
Structure
and
Security of
Property
Rights subindex

World Economic
Forum Global
Competitive
Index

Property
Rights subindex

The more guaranteed the
legal protection of property,
the higher a country’s index
score; likewise, the greater
the
probability
of
government
expropriating
property, the lower a
country’s score.
The index is intended to
capture the security of
property rights and the
enforcement of contracts. A
rating close to 10 indicates
that property rights are well
established and that the
quality of the supportive
legal system is high.
A high country score suggest
that property rights are
clearly defined and well
protected by law. A low
country score imply poorly
defined property rights not
protected by a proper legal
system.

Ranking
Scale
Low High
10% 100%

Number of
Countries

Years of Data
Availability

183

1995-2009

141

1970-2006

1

10

131

2000-2008

1

7

Note: The description of each property rights index is based on information derived from the website of each source. Heritage
Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index of Economic Freedom: http://www.heritage.org/Index/; Fraser Institute Economic Freedom
World Index: http://www.freetheworld.com/; World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index:
http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm.
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Table 2
Correlation in Level between each Property Rights Index.
FRASER
HERITAGE
HERITAGE

1.0
(1635)

FRASER

0.80***
(827)

1.0
(827)

WEF

0.84***
(517)

0.88***
(508)

WEF

1.00
(517)

Note: The correlation matrix is based on observations between 1995 and 2005. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate
significance levels, respectively. Finally, the number of correlated observations is in parentheses.
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Table 3
Correlation in Change and Improvement between each Property Rights Index.
FRASER
HERITAGE
Change
HERITAGE

Improvement

Change

Improvement

1.0
(1472)

1.0
(1635)

FRASER

0.08*
(602)

0.02
(827)

1.0
(602)

1.0
(827)

WEF

0.04
(396)

-0.05
(517)

-0.13***
(391)

0.04
(508)

WEF

Change

Improvement

1.00
(396)

1.00
(517)

Note: The correlation matrix is based on observations between 1995 and 2005. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate
significance levels, respectively. The number of correlated observations is in parentheses.
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Table 4
Associations between Property Rights, Infant Mortality and GDP per Capita, 1995 to 2005.
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
HERITAGE
FRASER
WEF
Full Variation
Property Rights Index
Level of Infant Mortality
Rates

-0.66***

-0.75***

-0.67***

Level of GDP per Capita

0.74***

0.77***

0.76***

Dynamic Variation
Property Rights Change

Pearson Correlation Coefficients
HERITAGE
FRASER
WEF

Growth in Infant Mortality
Rates

0.25***

-0.05

0.05

Growth in GDP per Capita

-0.14***

0.07†

0.08†

Note: The Pearson Correlation Coefficients are based on observations between 1995 and 2005. †p<0.10 and ***p<0.001
indicate significance levels, respectively.
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Table 5
Effect of the Level of Property Rights on Real GDP per Capita Growth.
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita Growth
FRASER
WEF
HERITAGE
Model
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Method
REM
FEM
REM
FEM
REM
FEM
Property Rights
-0.04*** -0.06***
0.14
0.70**
-0.70*
0.15
Index
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.15)
(0.27)
(0.36)
(0.57)
Openness

0.01**
(0.00)

0.06***
(0.01)

0.00
(0.00)

0.05**
(0.02)

0.01
(0.00)

0.08***
(0.03)

Inflation

-0.60***
(0.15)

-0.87***
(0.18)

-0.20
(0.18)

-0.48**
(0.22)

-0.32
(0.21)

-0.67***
(0.25)

0.03**
(0.15)

0.01
(0.01)

0.03
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)

0.02*
(0.01)

0.01
(0.01)

Savings Rate

0.03
(0.02)

0.08
(0.06)

0.04*
(0.03)

0.11
(0.07)

0.06*
(0.03)

0.10
(0.14)

Initial GDP per
Capita

0.00
(0.00)

—

-0.00
(0.00)

—

0.00
(0.00)

—

4.55***
(0.88)

1.61
(1.81)

1.23
(1.04)

-6.78**
(3.12)

5.91***
(1.41)

-4.67
(5.62)

1240

1240

696

696

462

462

Number of Countries

139

139

123

123

105

105

R-squared

0.08

0.16

0.12

0.15

0.20

0.25

Foreign Direct
Investment/GDP

Constant
Observations

Note: These are cross-sectional time-series regressions run in random-effects (REM) and fixed-effects (FEM) models where
standard errors are clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling and for robustness to serial correlation. The
regression coefficients are based on observations between 1995 and 2005. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate significance
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the percentage growth in real GDP per
capita. Property Rights Index is the level of one of the three measures of property rights protection (HERITAGE, FRASER,
WEF). Openness is trade openness, measured as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Inflation is log inflation
in the consumer price index. Foreign Direct Investment/GDP is Foreign Direct Investment as a percentage of GDP. Savings Rate
is gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. Initial GDP per Capita is the level of GDP per capita in 1995.
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Table 6
Effect of Improved Property Rights on Real GDP per Capita Growth.
Dependent Variable: Real GDP per Capita Growth
FRASER
HERITAGE
Model
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Method
REM
FEM
REM
FEM
Improved Property
-0.12
0.02
0.72*
0.62*
Rights
(0.48)
(0.37)
(0.37)
(0.53)
Openness
Inflation

0.01*
(0.00)

WEF
(11)
REM
0.11
(0.22)

(12)
FEM
0.30
(0.22)

0.06***
(0.01)

0.01
(0.00)

0.05**
(0.02)

0.01
(0.00)

0.08***
(0.03)

-0.50*** -0.87***
(0.14)
(0.18)

-0.21
(0.18)

-0.48**
(0.22)

-0.30
(0.21)

-0.68***
(0.25)

Foreign Direct
Investment/GDP

0.03*
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)

0.03
(0.02)

0.01
(0.01)

0.02
(0.01)

0.01*
(0.01)

Savings Rate

0.01
(0.02)

0.07
(0.06)

0.05*
(0.02)

0.10
(0.07)

0.04
(0.03)

0.1
(0.14)

Initial GDP per
Capita

-0.00
(0.00)

—

-0.00
(0.00)

—

-0.00
(0.00)

—

2.84***
(0.83)

-1.66
(1.73)

1.90**
(0.79)

-2.27
(2.19)

3.36***
(0.89)

-4.03
(4.29)

1240

1240

696

696

462

462

Number of Countries

139

139

123

123

105

105

R-squared

0.07

0.14

0.13

0.14

0.14

0.25

Constant
Observations

Note: These are cross-sectional time-series regressions run in random-effects (REM) and fixed-effects (FEM) models where
standard errors are clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling and for robustness to serial correlation. The
regression coefficients are based on observations between 1995 and 2005. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate significance
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is the percentage growth in real GDP per
capita. Improved Property Rights is a dummy variable representing improved property rights scores in each respective property
rights measure (HERITAGE, FRASER and WEF), which takes on the value of one if the country improved in protecting
property rights in a specific year, and zero otherwise. Openness is trade openness, measured as the sum of imports and exports as
a percentage of GDP. Inflation is log inflation in the consumer price index. Foreign Direct Investment/GDP is Foreign Direct
Investment as a percentage of GDP. Savings Rate is gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. Initial GDP per Capita is the
level of GDP per capita in 1995.
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Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Table 7
Descriptive Statistics
Summary Statistics
Variables

Heritage Property Rights Index
Fraser Property Rights Index
WEF Property Rights Index
Log Infant Mortality
Log GDP per capita
% Growth in GDP per capita
Openness
Log Inflation
FDI/GDP
Savings Rate
Initial GDP
per Capita (1995)

Mean
(SD)
51.60
(23.75)
5.63
(1.93)
4.74
(1.15)
3.18
(1.11)
7.65
(1.60)
2.71
(4.40)
84.77
(48.74)
1.62
(1.32)
2.68
(7.55)
17.77
(13.69)
5376.46
(7237.35)

Number of
Observations

1635
827
517
1456
1567
1589
1560
1412
1423
1570
1635
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Appendix 2. Summary of Heritage Foundation Property Rights Index
Table 8
Correlation Summary of Heritage Foundation Property Rights Index.
Correlation Matrix
Property Rights Index

1

Log Infant Mortality

-0.66***

1

Log GDP per Capita

0.74***

-0.90***

1

-0.10***

-0.05**

0.04

1

0.23***

-0.22***

0.24***

0.14***

1

-0.36***

0.39***

-0.10***

-0.11***

1

-0.06**

0.07**

-0.09***

0.09***

0.16***

0.03

1

0.32***

-0.35***

0.51***

0.13***

0.26***

-0.19***

-0.10***

1

0.43***

-0.52***

0.51***

0.01

0.07***

-0.32***

-0.08***

0.11***

% Growth in real
GDP per capita
Openness
Log Inflation

-0.41***

FDI/GDP
Savings Rate
Initial GDP per
Capita (1995)

Note: The correlation matrix is based on observations between 1995 and 2005. Each variable is correlated with the Heritage
Foundation Property Rights Index level. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate significance levels, respectively.
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Appendix 3. Summary of Fraser Institute Property Rights Index
Table 9
Correlation Summary of Fraser Institute Property Rights Index.
Correlation Matrix
Property Rights Index

1

Log Infant Mortality

-0.75***

1

Log GDP per Capita

0.77***

-0.90***

1

0.07**

-0.06**

0.04

1

0.26***

-0.22***

0.24***

0.14***

1

-0.33***

0.39***

-0.10***

-0.11***

1

-0.07*

0.07**

-0.09***

0.09***

0.16***

0.03

1

0.37***

-0.35***

0.51***

0.13***

0.26***

-0.19***

-0.10***

1

0.49***

-0.52***

0.51***

0.01

0.07***

-0.32***

-0.08***

0.11***

% Growth in real
GDP per capita
Openness
Log Inflation

-0.41***

FDI/GDP
Savings Rate
Initial GDP per
Capita (1995)

Note: The correlation matrix is based on observations between 1995 and 2005. Each variable is correlated with the Fraser
Institute Property Rights Index level. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate significance levels, respectively.
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Appendix 4. Summary of WEF Property Rights Index
Table 10
Correlation Summary of World Economic Forum Property Rights Index.
Correlation Matrix
Property Rights Index

1

Log Infant Mortality

-0.67***

1

Log GDP per Capita

0.76***

-0.90***

1

-0.17***

-0.06**

0.04

1

0.21***

-0.22***

0.24***

0.14***

1

-0.44***

0.39***

-0.10***

-0.11***

1

-0.07

0.07**

-0.09***

0.09***

0.16***

0.03

1

0.36***

-0.35***

0.51***

0.13***

0.26***

-0.19***

-0.10***

1

0.52***

-0.52***

0.51***

0.01

0.07***

-0.32***

-0.08***

0.11***

% Growth in real
GDP per capita
Openness
Log Inflation

-0.41***

FDI/GDP
Savings Rate
Initial GDP per
Capita (1995)

Note: The correlation matrix is based on observations between 1995 and 2005. Each variable is correlated with the World
Economic Forum Property Rights Index level. * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 indicate significance levels, respectively.
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